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Restrictions on Electric Utility Advertising 
In response to the 1973 oil embargo, the New York Public Ser-
vice Commission (PSC) took steps to minimize consumption of elec-
tricity.1 Among other restraints, the PSC ordered electric utilities to 
discontinue "promoting the use of electricity through advertising, 
subsidy payments . . . or employee incentives."2 Although the crisis 
has passed, the ban persists, to further a policy of energy conserva-
tion decreed by the New York state legislature.3 Two New York 
public utilities - Central Hudson Gas and Electric Company (Cen-
tral Hudson) and Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) - have 
challenged the ban,4 citing recent Supreme Court opinions that ex-
tended first amendment protection to "speech which does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction."5 Unfortunately, the Court 
l. Notice of Proposal to Issue Order Restricting Certain Uses of Electric Energy, 13 N.Y. 
PSC 2074-76 (issued Dec. 5, 1973). The Commission soberly observed the effects of the em-
bargo: "the demands for electric energy in this state cannot be met for the foreseeable future 
without significant reductions in usage in view of the lack of sufficient fuels to generate elec-
tricity ." Id. at 2072. 
2. Id. at 2076. 
3. N.Y. ENERGY LAW§ 3-101 (McKinney 1979). In July 1976, the Public Service Com-
mission solicited "co=ents on the subjects of advertising by utilities and promotion of elec-
tricity sales." Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Public 
Utilities, 17 N.Y. PSC 1-R (issued Feb. 25, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Statement]. Proponents 
of advertising responded that generating facilities were underused during the winter and that 
increased off-peak consumption would spread the burden of fixed costs, possibly lowering 
rates. See id. at 2-R. Despite these arguments, the PSC reaffirmed the ban in February 1977, 
id. at 2-R, 3-R, explaining that the "increased requirement for fuel oil to serve the incremental 
off-peak load would ... frustrate rather than encourage conservation efforts." Id. at 2-R. 
The Commission expressly allowed time-of-day rate advertising as "informational": 
It is reasonable to believe that a continued proscription of electric sales will result in some 
dampening of unnecessary growth so that society's total energy requirements will be 
somewhat lower than they would have been had electric utilities been allowed to promote 
sales . 
. . . We recognize, however, that as we move toward more and more widespread 
adoption of time-of-day rates, it may be highly desirable for companies to publicize those 
rates, and point out the various ways in which customers may take advantage of them. 
While this advertising may better be described as informational, we wish to make clear, in 
any case, that it is our desire to permit advertising of this kind, provided it has the exclu-
sive, or at least preponderant effect of encouragii:ig sh!fts of consumption from peak to off-
peak and little or no effect of increasing aggregate sales. 
Id. at 2-R, 3-R (emphasis original). 
4. The companies first filed petitions for rehearing which were denied. Order Denying 
Petition for Rehearing, 17 N.Y. PSC 17-R, 22-R (issued July 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Order]. Central Hudson took its grievance to state court and lost. Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
New York Pub. Serv. Commn., 63 A.D.2d 364,407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1978), qffd., 47 N.Y.2d 94, 
390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, prob. juris. noted sub nom. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 100 S. Ct. 446 (1979). LILCO went to federal district court and 
won. Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., (1979] 5 MEDIAL. REP. 
(CCH) 1241 (E.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 702 (1980). 
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commn., 413 U.S. 
433 
434 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 78:433 
has not defined the limits of that protection,6 and the lack of defini-
tion has spawned contradictory decisions by the courts that have 
considered the New York utility challenges. The New York Court of 
Appeals sustained the ban,7 while a federal district court struck it 
down. 8 Both courts agreed that the advertising ban was directed at 
commercial speech, but they differed over the extent to which the 
first amendment protects such speech. 
This Note reconsiders the constitutionality of New York's restric-
tion on advertising by electric utilities. Section I ·explains how and 
why the Supreme Court's current analysis of the first amendment 
distinguishes commercial speech from other forms of speech. Sec-
tion II looks at what protection is due commercial speech and weighs 
the competing interests in the specific context of utility advertising. 
376, 385 (1973)). The Court struck down a state statute prohibiting drug price advertising; it 
rejected the state's argument that such advertising would lead to unprofessional conduct by 
pharmacists. The Court denied that commercial advertising "is so removed from any 'exposi-
tion of ideas' and from ' "truth, science, morality and the arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments"' that it lacks all protection." 425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted). The Court 
thus put to rest the theory, prevalent since Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), that 
commercial speech was not covered by the guarantees of the first amendment. 
In Chrestensen, the Court had unanimously upheld a local ordinance forbidding "distribu-
tion in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter." 316 U.S. at 53. 
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the 
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, 
they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. 
We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising. 
316 U.S. at 54. 
The demise of the Chrestensen view was foreshadowed in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975), where the Court reversed the conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor who had adver-
tised the availability of abortions in New York. The Court observed that the "relationship of 
speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the market-
place ofideas." 421 U.S. at 826. The Bigelow Court concluded: "Regardless of the particular 
label, . . . a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake 
by weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation." 421 U.S. at 826, 
The Bigelow advertisement, however, "did more than simply propose a commercial trans-
action." 421 U.S. at 822. It communicated information on a controversial subject of "public 
interest." 421 U.S. at 822. A "fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a 'commercial 
speech' exception,'' 425 U.S. at 760, remained until Virginia Board of Pharmacy extended first 
amendment protection to speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." 
425 U.S. at 762. 
6. In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that the perim-
eters of commercial speech protection are still uncertain: 
Because of the special character of commercial speech and the relative novelty of First 
Amendment protection for such speech, we act with caution in confronting First Amend-
ment challenges to economic legislation that serves legitimate regulatory interests. Our 
decisions dealing with more traditional First Amendment problems do not extend auto• 
matically to this as yet uncharted area. . . . When dealing with restrictions on commer-
cial speech we frame our decisions narrowly .... 
440 U.S. at 11 n.9. 
7. Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 
749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), a.ffg. 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1978). 
8. Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., (1979) 5 MEDIAL. REP, 
(CCH) 1241 (E.D.N.Y.). 
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The Note concludes that states may restrict utility advertising to en-
courage energy conservation. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PARSING OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The Supreme Court moved very slowly toward protecting com-
mercial speech, which it once held completely outside the purview of 
the first amendment.9 Until 1975, the Court divided all expression 
into "protected speech," which could be regulated only when neces-
sary to prevent imminent lawless action, 10 and ''unprotected 
speech," which could be regulated in any manner that met the basic 
requirements of due process and equal protection. Then, in Bigelow 
v. Virginia 11 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 12 the Court decided that the first amend-
ment's protections do extend to commercial speech. But in more 
recent cases, different forms of commercial speech seem to have re-
ceived different degrees of protection. Some forms are fully pro-
tected - they may be regulated only for exigent reasons. 13 But most 
commercial speech falls into an intermediate category of somewhat 
regulable commercial speech.14 Given the novelty of the holding 
that commercial speech is protected at all, the Court has only been 
able to hint at why regulable commercial speech should be distin-
guished from fully protected speech (which may be commercial or 
ideological) and how much protection regulable commercial speech 
deserves. This Section attempts to inf er answers to those questions. 
The Court has often referred to the "commonsense differences" 15 
between speech that does "no more than propose a commercial 
transaction"16 and other varieties of speech. Nonetheless, the Court 
has subtly and gradually shifted its interpretation of those common-
sense differences and their implications for how to determine what 
protection a particular type of speech deserves. In Virginia Board of 
9. See note 5 supra. 
10. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
11. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
12. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
13. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive advertising); 
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) ("For Sale" signs advertising 
residential property); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion advertising). See also 
note 29 infra. 
14. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (optometrists' trademarks); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (in-person solicitation by attorneys); Bates v. State Bar, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (newspaper advertisement of attorney fees); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prescription drug advertis-
ing). 
15. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). 
16. 425 U.S. at 762. 
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Pharmacy, for example, the Court announced that subject matter 
alone is not the basis of the distinction. Rather, the Court empha-
sized that commercial speech is more "easily verifiable by its dissem-
inator'' and more "durable" than other speech because it is essential 
to business profits. In theory, commercial speech would be less eas-
ily chilled and thus need less protection. 17 
Yet profit-motivation cannot alone differentiate commercial 
speech from other speech. Ideological speech may be both moti-
vated by profit and easily verified, while business advertising may 
pursue goals beyond profit and may include unverifiable claims. 18 
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court offered other, more enduring 
reasons to distinguish regulable commercial speech from fully pro-
tected speech. 19 Commercial speech partakes of both speech and ec-
onomic activity: it is expression that seeks to influence the conduct 
of buyers and sellers in the market more than ideological speech. As 
a form of market activity, the proposal of a commercial transaction 
"occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation."20 
What makes commercial speech regulable is its role in economic ac-
tivity ordinarily regulable by the state.21 The state should not "lose 
~ts power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the 
public whenever speech is a component of that activity."22 
Therefore, the Court does not accord full first amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech affecting regulable economic activity. 
Indeed, the Court has pointed out that if it were to give full protec-
tion to all commercial speech, it might endanger ideological speech: 
"To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a level-
ing process, of the force of the amendment's guarantee with respect 
to the latter kind of speech."23 
Yet knowing what determines the proper level of first amend-
ment scrutiny is not enough to make that determination easy in all 
cases. Speech relating to commerce within the legitimate scope of 
government regulation may also be tinged with ideological concerns 
that implicate more traditional first amendment values; the line be-
tween fully protected speech and regulable commercial speech may 
17. 425 U.S. at 761-62, 771 n.24. 
18. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 14 Nw. U. L. REV, 372, 
382-86 (1979). 
19. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 
(1978). The cases are discussed in text at notes 24-27 i,!fi-a. 
20. 436 U.S. at 456. 
21. See Farber, supra note 18, at 386-87; Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic 
.Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. l_, 1-2 (1979). 
22. 436 U.S. at 456. 
23. 436 U.S. at 456. 
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be fine indeed. The Court's willingness to draw that line is apparent 
from its recent treatment of companion cases. 
In Ohralik v. Ohio State .Bar Association,24 an attorney personally 
solicited contingent fee agreements from two young accident vic-
tims. 25 In re Primus26 involved an ACLU attorney who informed an 
indigent woman that free legal representation was available to press 
a claim of coerced sterilization. Both attorneys faced disciplinary 
action for unprofessional conduct. The Court held that the conduct 
of the ACLU attorney deserved full first amendment safeguards; 
Ohralik.'s conduct, in contrast, deserved less protection. Primus dis-
tinguished the commercial speech in Ohralik by examining the mo-
tive of the speaker and the content of the speech: 
Normally the purpose or motive of the speaker is not central to First 
Amendment protection, but it does bear on the distinction between 
conduct that is "an associational aspect of 'expression' " . . . and other 
activity subject to plenary regulation by government. . . . In Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Assn., . : . the lawyer was not engaged in associa-
tional activity for the advancement of beliefs and ideas; his purpose 
was the advancement of his own commercial interests. The line, based 
in part on the motive of the speaker and the character of the expressive 
activity, will not always be easy to draw, ... but that is no reason for 
avoiding the undertaking.27 
24. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
25. The Court described Ohralik's conduct: 
He approached two young accident victims at a time when they were especially incapable 
of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their own interests. He 
solicited Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she lay in traction and sought out 
Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital, knowing from his prior 
inquiries that she had just been released. Appellant urged his services upon the young 
women and used the information he had obtained from the McClintocks, and the fact of 
his agreement with Carol, to induce Wanda to say "O.K." in response to his solicitation. 
He employed a concealed tape recorder, seemingly to assure that he would have evidence 
of Wanda's oral assent to the representation. He emphasized that his fee would come out 
of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women with what sounded like a cost-free 
and therefore irresistable offer. He refused to withdraw when Mrs. Holbert requested him 
to do so only a day after the initial meeting between appellant and Wanda Lou and con-
tinued to represent himself to the insurance company as Wanda Holbert's lawyer. 
436 U.S. at 467. 
26. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
27. 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. This test dissatisfied Justice Rehnquist. He treated the concep-
tual basis for the co=ercial speech distinction and the practical means of identifying com-
mercial speech as one issue: 
[T]o the extent that this "common-sense" distinction focuses on the content of the speech, 
it is at least suspect under many of this Court's First Amendment cases, and to the extent 
it focuses on the motive of the speaker, it is subject to manipulation by clever practition-
ers. . . . [W]e may be sure that the next lawyer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for 
similar conduct will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of "political association" 
to assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policy holders. 
. . . I believe that constitutional inquiry must focus on the character of the conduct 
which the State seeks to regulate, and not on the motives of the individual lawyers or the 
nature of the particular litigation involved. 
436 U.S. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In defining co=ercial speech and deciding to 
accord it lesser protection, the Court has focused on the "character of the conduct which the 
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It should be stressed that this test does not reduce the protection 
given all speech that is commercial and nonideological. Reduced 
protection attaches only to speech concerning regulable commercial 
activity. Some commercial activity, like political activity, is not sub-
ject to plenary regulation by government. It may, for example, relate 
to the exercise of fundamental rights, like the right to travel or the 
right of privacy, which the state may not infringe without a "compel-
ling" interest.28 Where commercial speech affects such activity, the 
Court has extended traditional first amendment protection,29 and 
permitted regulation only of speech that is likely to incite lawless 
action. 30 In sum, speech that affects regulable commercial activity is 
entitled to less protection than ideological speech or speech affecting 
an activity beyond the legitimate scope of government regulation. 
The specific forms of speech subject to the New York PSC ban 
are clear examples of regulable commercial speech. The advertise-
ments contemplated by the utilities are not ideological; LILCO, for 
example, wanted only to encourage the use of electric space heat-
ing. 31 The ban does not prohibit the sorts of political advertisements 
State seeks to regulate." See text at notes 20-21 supra. But the Primus majority treated as a 
separate issue the means of identifying speech that bears the requisite relationship to regulable 
activity. In determining whether speech is likely, in fact, to affect regulable activity, the major-
ity inquired (1) whether the speaker is attempting to affect economic, as opposed to political, 
activity; and (2) whether the co=unication is in the nature of a solicitation or provision of 
information. 
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 
(1969). 
29. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
In Carey, the Court struck down a statute that restricted advertisement of contraceptives. 
The Court found the advertising related to the exercise of the individual's right of privacy, and 
held that the advertising was not directed to producing illicit sexual conduct. 
In Linmark, the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting display of "For Sale" signs on 
residential property. The township sought to curtail panic selling and promote racial integra-
tion in the co=unity. The court held that citizens "have a right to decide where to live and 
raise their families." 431 U.S at 96. The Court distinguished Linmark from Barrick Realty, 
Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), where the Seventh Circuit upheld a prohibi-
tion on "For Sale" signs. The Court expressed "no view," 431 U.S. at 95, as to whether Barrick 
Realty is still good law; Barrick Realty may survive on the ground that the state may have had 
a compelling interest in regulating real estate sales. 
In Bigelow, the Court struck down a Virginia statute prohibiting advertisements of abor-
tion services that were available in New York. "[T]he advertisement related to activity with 
which, at least in some respects, the State could not interfere." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S 748, 760 (1976). Virginia lacked authority to 
prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain an abortion, "could not prosecute 
them for going there, and could not regulate the services provided in New York." Farber, 
supra note 18, at 378. Striking down the statute against abortion advertising, the Bigelow 
Court noted, "We need not decide in this case the precise extent to which the First Amend-
ment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately 
regulate or even prohibit." 421 U.S. at 825. 
30. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
31. Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., [1979] 5 MEDIAL. REP, 
(CCH) 1241, 1241 (E.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 702 (1980). 
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(such as an advertisement calling for an end to the ban itself) that 
advance "beliefs and ideas" and are therefore entitled to full protec-
tion. Nor do the advertisements serve any fundamental rights: the 
Supreme Court has expressly denied that there is any fundamental 
right to shelter,32 the most important interest whose exercise is facili-
tated by electric utility services. Promotional advertising by electric 
utilities is a component of economic activity - the production and 
sale of electricity - that has long been regulated by the government. 
States have enjoyed extensive powers to regulate public utilities, 
which are natural monopolies affected with a public interest.33 The 
advertisements banned by New York's Public Service Commission 
are thus commercial speech that a state may regulate more than ide-
ological speech, but less than commercial activity involving no 
speech at all. The next Section of this Note will develop the Court's 
standard for measuring the permissible scope of regulations that in-
hibit regulable commercial speech. It will then apply that standard 
to the PSC ban. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S BALANCE OF COMPETING INTERESTS 
In its decisions concerning regulable commercial speech, the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly set forth the characteristics of a 
valid limitation on regulable commercial speech. Nevertheless, the 
decisions reveal a consistent effort to balance the interests in unre-
strained commercial expression against the particular goal a state 
hopes to serve by regulation. Ever since Virginia Board of Phar-
macy, the Court has recognized that commercial speech may contain 
valuable information for public and private economic decisions, 34 
and that not every state interest is enough to override that value.35 A 
regulation that survives the scrutiny of the due process and equal 
32. See Lindsey v. Nonnet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Even if a fundamental right to shelter 
were found, New York could still abridge that right if its interest in energy conservation were 
compelling. See also note 81 inji-a and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976). Cf. Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U S. 113, 126 (1876) (recognizing state authority to regulate industry "affected with a public 
interest"). 
34. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. l, 8-15 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 
447, 455-59 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-82 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-64 (1976). 
35. The Court has "weighed" those interests in its decisions. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 
I, 9 (1979). The LILCO court relied on language in Virginia Board of Pharmacy that suggested 
truthful commercial advertising oflegal activity is categorically immune from government reg-
ulation. The Supreme Court's decisions since Virginia Board of Pharmacy, however, have not 
relied on such a categorical rule. The cases have tended to be one-sided - either the speech 
restriction was only remotely connected to a state interest, see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 
368-79 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 769 (1976), or the particular form of the advertising tended to obstruct, rather than 
facilitate, informed decision, see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 12-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978), put they have all examined the relative weights of 
the competing interests. 
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protection clauses may be inadequate to justify an abridgement of 
commercial speech interests.36 More recent cases, however, have ac-
knowledged that states need to regulate the conduct of business.37 
The Court has assessed the interests in regulation by asking whether 
the restriction on speech promotes a substantial state purpose and by 
demanding that the restriction and the regulable activity be closely 
connected. 38 
The PSC ban is founded in a well-articulated concern for pre-
36. See 425 U.S. at 769. The Virginia statute prohibiting drug price advertising had sur-
vived the former challenge, see Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W,D. Va, 
1969), but fell as a violation of freedom of speech, even though the Court identified a strong 
state interest in maintaining high professional standards for pharmacists. Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), 
Traditionally, a state can regulate virtually any economic activity it chooses as long as it 
does not do so capriciously or arbitrarily. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 
(1976). Recently, however, the Court has inquired more searchingly into such regulation, 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion), and Trimble v. 
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), suggest that indirect regulatory means may invite close inspec-
tion similar to that of co=ercial speech regulation, which may also be indirect. In Moore, an 
ordinance aimed at "preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and 
avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland's school system," 431 U.S. at 499-500, 
defined which categories of relatives "could occupy a single dwelling unit." 431 U.S. at 498. 
The city prosecuted a woman for living with her grandson, and the Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction because the ordinance violated due process. Justice Powell's plurality opinion 
found the section defining "family" to exclude certain relatives had "but a tenuous relation to 
alleviation of the conditions mentioned by the city." 431 U.S. at 500. In Trimble, an equal 
protection case, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute permitting "illegitimate children to 
inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers." 430 U.S. at 763. Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the majority, observed that the statute bore "only the most attenuated relationship to 
the asserted goal" of promoting legitimate family relationships. 430 U.S. at 768. 
31. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U S. 447 (1978); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 
U.S. 1 (1979). Ohralik discussed the importance of regulating the professional conduct of 
lawyers and upheld a Bar Association rule against in-person solicitation of clients under which 
state courts had disciplined Ohralik. The Court found it likely that in-person solicitation 
would injure consumers although no harm was shown in this case, See text at notes 24-27 
supra. Friedman upheld a ban against use of trade names by optometrists as a practice that 
may mislead the public regarding the source and quality of optometry services. The Court 
emphasized, however, "that the restriction on the use of trade names has only the most inci-
dental effect on the content of the co=ercial speech of ... optometrists." 440 U.S. at 15-16. 
38. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 
U.S. 447, 460-72 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 766-70 (1976). In Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy the Court found the restriction an unreasonable method to pursue the state 
interest because there was an inadequate causal connection between the advertisement of drug 
prices and deterioration of professional standards among licensed pharmacists. 
The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the 
other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the free 
flow of drug information. There is no claim that the advertising ban in any way prevents 
the cutting of comers by the pharmacist who is so inclined. 
425 U.S. at 769. In addition, the restriction tended "to discourage consumers from purchasing 
the drugs prescribed for them, an intent which, presumably, was not that of the Virginia legis-
lature." Brief of Appellee at 30, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Bates, the Court considered the constitutionality of a bar 
association rule against price advertising by attorneys. Reserving the question of the status of 
attorney advertisement of the quality of legal services, the Court extended first amendment 
protection to newspaper "advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal 
services." 433 U.S. at 384. The Court asserted that this was valuable information for consum-
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serving scarce resources by discouraging unnecessary consumption. 
The commercial speech interests in allowing utilities to broadcast 
promotional advertisements are largely economic; those that are not 
economic are burdened only slightly by the ban. Closer study of 
these elements in the balance will reveal that the ban should with-
stand first amendment scrutiny. 
A. The State's Interest in Continuing the Advertising Ban 
The state must show a higher interest in regulating utility adver-
tising than it would have to show to regulate other commerce.39 The 
Court does not, however, treat commercial advertising as "speech 
which our Constitution has immunized from government control."40 
In other contexts, the Court has noted that the "scope and nature of 
the economic activities of incorporated organizations . . . demand 
that the constitutional power of the federal and state governments to 
regulate those activities be correspondingly effective."41 In assessing 
the strength of the state's interest in restrictions like the utility adver-
tising ban, the Court has considered (1) the importance to the state of 
regulating the underlying economic activity, and (2) the reasonable-
ness of advertising restrictions as a means to promote the state's reg-
ulatory purpose. By these criteria, the PSC ban fares quite well. 
New York seeks to discourage increased electricity consumption to 
minimize the state's dependence on foreign oil and to keep down the 
cost of energy. The advertising ban prevents companies from stimu-
lating consumption that undermines these ends. 
1. The Substantiality of the State's Interest 
In each case evaluating restrictions on regulable commercial 
speech, the Supreme Court has commented on the substantiality of 
the state's regulatory interest.42 Conceivably, the Court might find 
an interest substantial only if it met some independent standards of 
importance. Yet the Court has never invalidated a speech restriction 
because the state's interest was insubstantial; the Court will probably 
conclude that any interest the state considers significant enough to 
promote through regulation is substantial. The Court has not even 
demanded that the interests served by advertising restrictions be 
ers, and that such advertising was only remotely related to unprofessional conduct among 
lawyers. 
39. The Court submits advertising restrictions to "close inspection," Bates v. State Bar, 433 
U.S. 350, 365 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976). . 
40. 395 U.S. at 448. 
41. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1974) (denying member of partnership right 
to invoke privilege against self-incrimination regarding production of business records he held 
in his capacity as partner) (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)). 
42. See note 37 supra. 
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among the state's most important goals. Admittedly, the Ohralik 
Court referred to the state's "particularly strong"43 interest in regu-
lating attorneys, who "are essential to the primary governmental 
function of administering justice."44 But Justice Powell did not limit 
valid advertising restrictions to those that advance a "primary" state 
purpose. Indeed, his use of the term "important"45 suggests that he 
also had broader purposes in mind. 
New York's interest in promoting energy conservation falls 
within the class that the Court has regarded as substantial. Both the 
LILCO and Consolidated Edison courts agreed on the importance of 
New York's interest in conserving energy. In LILCO, the federal 
district court recognized that "the public interests to be served by the 
PSC are important."46 In Consolidated Edison, the New York Court 
of Appeals observed: "Conserving diminishing resources is a matter 
of vital state concern."47 The Supreme Court itself has acknowl-
edged that "energy conservation . . . and environmental protection 
are goals that are important and of legitimate state concern."48 The 
crippling effects of the 1973 oil embargo, the unpredictability of the 
OPEC nations, and the general national interest in energy conserva-
tion underscore the urgency of New York's interest in conservation. 
New York, furthermore, takes conservation seriously enough to 
express its concern in legislation. The New York Energy Law49 and 
the New York Public Service Law50 establish energy conservation as 
a policy of the state and mandate educational programs, product reg-
ulation, a master energy plan, and other measures to encourage con-
servation. 51 Moreover, New York's energy policy serves goals 
beyond simply reducing the consumption of energy. The state seeks 
to 
maintain an adequate and continuous supply of safe, dependable, and 
economical energy for the people of the state . . . all in order to pro-
mote the state's economic growth, to create employment within the 
43. 436 U.S. at 460. 
44. 436 U.S. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)). 
45. 436 U.S. at 462. 
46. [1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1241, 1245. 
47. 47 N.Y.2d at ll0, 390 N.E.2d at 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39. 
48. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. l, 28 (1977). 
49. See N.Y. ENERGY LAW§ 1-101 note (McKinney 1979): 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the people of New York state have suffered 
shortages of all forms of energy; that such shortages are likely to recur; that New York is 
overly dependent on sources of energy outside the state; and such shortages and high costs 
have been inimical to health, safety, and welfare of the people. 
The state must therefore take steps to meet these shortages and high costs by cutting 
energy waste and reducing energy consumption •... It must do so by minimizing the 
risks to human health and the environment; and by maximizing the benefits to New York 
labor, business and industry. . . . 
50. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW§ 5 (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
51. See, e.g., N.Y. ENERGY LAW§§ 5-107(1), (3); 5-110; 9 (McKinney 1979). 
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state, to protect its environmental values, to husband its resources for 
future generations, and to promote the health and welfare of its people 
52 
An energy shortage, as this policy recognizes, dries out the entire 
economic and social system of the state. At the same time, a radical 
shift from existing technologies could exact a heavy environmental 
and human toll.53 New York's policy, therefore, reconciles compet-
ing vital interests54 - interests comparable to the state interest in 
regulating solicitation by lawyers, which the Ohralik Court upheld. 
2. The Reasonableness of the PSC Ban 
Under the Court's analysis, a regulation limiting commercial 
speech must not only further a substantial interest but also further 
that interest in a reasonable way. In early cases, the Court looked to 
the link between the harm the state sought to regulate and the com-
mercial speech it wanted to prohibit. Where the link was- "severely 
strained," the Court did not uphold the regulation;55 conversely, 
where the connection between advertising and harmful activity was 
strong, the Court hesitated to overturn legislative judgment and ad-
ministrative expertise. 56 In one case, the Court phrased this require-
ment of a reasonable means as a suggestion that the state may not 
limit advertising if other, less inhibitive, regulation is feasible. 57 
The harm that New York seeks to avoid is the waste of fuel that 
attends unnecessary increases in the use of electricity. Converting 
fossil fuels to electricity is relatively inefficient. 58 Energy is lost be-
cause of "poor conversion efficiency at the powerplant and the sig-
nificant transmission line losses."59 One PSC study showed that 
"private home space conditioning by electricity consumes from 20 to 
144 percent more source energy than other heating modes under dif-
52. N.Y. ENERGY LAW§ 3-101(1) (McKinney 1979). 
53. See, e.g., Opinion and Order on Energy Conservation Measures, 14 N.Y. PSC 1215, 
1225. "[U]se of electricity makes a positive contribution to the air quality in New York [City], 
when compared with on-site oil-fired boilers. This is due primafily to the low level releases of 
on-site boilers and the high level stack releases of power plants." 
54. See N.Y. Pua. SERV. LAW§§ 4, 5, 65, 66 (McKinney Supp. 1979); Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., 47 N.Y.2d at 102-03, 390 N.E.2d at 753,417 N.Y.S.2d at 
34, prob. Juris. noted sub nom. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 100 
S. Ct. 446 (1979). 
55. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). 
56. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 
(1978). 
57. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
786 (1976). The Court coupled this observation, however, with a note on the lack of connec-
tion between the advertising and the object of regulation. 
58. Order, supra note 4, at 18-R. 
59. See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
ELECTRIC POWER 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. 
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fering conditions."60 Moreover, increased off-peak consumption of 
electricity would require the use of oil-fired generators, rather than 
coal-burning or nuclear generators,61 while one of the goals of the 
state's energy policy is to reduce oil use.62 
Thus, promoting the use of electricity causes a harm that New 
York has taken several legislative steps to prevent. The connection 
is direct: promotional activities by utilities are intended to increase 
consumption. of electricity. Banning that advertising, therefore, 
would further the state's policy of not increasing consumption. The 
connection is as direct as in other cases where the Court has upheld 
advertising restrictions. Although the Ohra!ik Court, for example, 
noted that attorney solicitation directly invaded privacy, it rested its 
holding more squarely on indirect dangers: undue influence on con-
sumer decisions and temptation to unprofessional conduct. 63 In 
Friedman v. Rogers,64 the Court found no direct harm, but held that 
optometrical trademarks indirectly tended to mislead the public and 
promote commercial optometry. 
To be sure, New York could reduce total consumption of elec-
tricity more directly by "fixing rates . . . or by allocating quantities 
of energy production."65 Indeed, the federal district court found the 
PSC ban unconstitutional because "increased usage of electric heat 
may be regulated by means that are not only more direct but also 
less restrictive of LILCO's first amendment rights . . . . "66 While 
superficially true, this statement misconceives the interests that the 
ban serves. Through the ban, the PSC seeks to prevent unnecessary 
and artificially induced consumption of electricity. It does so in a 
way that it hopes will have the fewest undesirable side effects. Fix-
ing rates - an admittedly less restrictive alternative - would mod-
ify the existing consumption patterns of electricity users and would 
have secondary economic effects on new users, who might have no 
choice ab9ut their needs to consume. Fixing rates might even waste 
energy resources by encouraging users to shift away from technolo-
gies in which they have already invested substantially. In choosing 
the policy it did, the PSC was concerned with such consequences. 67 
60. See Opinion and Order on Energy Conservation Measures, 14 N.Y. PSC 1215, 1224 
(1974). Electric water heating and cooking also consume approximately twice the source fuel 
as other methods. See ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 59, at 29. 
61. Statement, supra note 3, at 2-R. 
62. See notes 1-3 supra. 
63. 436 U.S. at 462. 
64. 440 U.S. I (1979). 
65. (1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1246. 
66. (1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1237. 
67. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text; 14 N.Y. PSC at 1228. The New York 
legislature has authorized the PSC to select methods of energy conservation, N.Y. Pua. SERV. 
LAW§§ 4, 5, 65, 66; Consolidated Edison v. New York Pub. Serv. Commn., 47 N.Y.2d 94 at 
January 1980] Note - Commercial Speech 445 
As the Supreme Court itself has noted: 
Rarely can it be said that a legislative or administrative body oper-
ating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a 
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the "dominant" 
or "primary" one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators 
are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing consider-
ations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, 
absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.68 
For almost any regulation of commercial speech, a court could prob-
ably find broad motivation that would be fulfilled more directly by 
an alternative that restricts speech less. A state might, for example, 
more directly prevent attorneys from overreaching by having the 
Court appoint counsel and set the fee in every case than by prohibit-
ing in-person solicitation. A pure "least restrictive alternative" test 
would effectively elevate commercial speech to the same level of pro-
tection as ideological speech, eliminating all legislative discretion. In 
its decisions, the Court seems to have chosen another path. The PSC 
ban is sufficiently linked to the harms caused by promotional adver-
tising to allow the state's substantial interests to' be weighed in the 
first amendment balance. 
B. The Informational Value of Promotional Advertising 
Against New York's interest in restricting utility advertising must 
be weighed the advertisements' contribution to the public welfare. If 
the information conveyed by commercial speech is important 
enough to outweigh the state's interest in regulation, the speech may 
not be prohibited. The commercial speech cases have held that ad-
vertising advances three interests: (1) the advertiser's interest in 
profit, (2) the consumer's interest in information on which to base 
consumption choices, and (3) society's interest in the free flow of im-
portant information. 69 The first two are relatively weak and cannot 
counterbalance the strong state interest in limiting electricity use. 
The third is more compelling, but under the Court's present stan-
dards, the state interest should prevail. 
I. The Advertiser's Interest in Profit 
The LILCO opinion echoed Virginia Board of Pharmacy's decla-
ration that the interest of the commercial advertiser is "purely eco-
102-03, 390 N.E.2d 749 at 753, 147 N.Y.S.2d 30 at 34, prob. Juris. noted sub nom. Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 100 S. Ct. 446 (1979). 
68. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (foot-
note omitted). 
69. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
762-65 (1976). 
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nomic."70 But economic interests are freely regulable within the 
"broad limits"71 of due process, which precludes only arbitrary and 
capricious government action. As the Court's opinions in Ohralik 
and Friedman confirm, the advertiser's economic interests cannot 
alone bar reasonable commercial speech regulation. In Ohrafik, the 
Court viewed a "lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment 
[as] a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment con-
cems."72 In Friedman, the Court barely acknowledged optometrists' 
interest in using trade names except to refer to its "economic na-
ture."73 Advertising will always mean profits for advertisers. Ac-
cording those profits more weight than any other economic interest 
would maim government authority to regulate commerce.74 There-
fore, as long as the New York ban is not arbitrary or capricious -
and this carefully considered policy could hardly be called either -
it need not yield to the utilities' interest in profits. 
2. The Consumer's Interest in Access to Commercial Information 
Although consumers obviously have an interest in advertising, 
that 'interest - standing alone - is not one that the Court would 
protect at the expense of New York's energy policy. Consumers read 
or listen to advertising because they want to make informed deci-
sions about products.75 That desire deserves respect, but no more 
than the consumer's legitimate desire to partake of the activity or 
commodity being advertised.76 Hence, advertising about illegal 
transactions can be entirely prohibited,77 while advertising that re-
lates to the exercise of fundamental rights receives full first amend-
ment protection.78 The consumer's interest in electric utility services, 
70. (1979) 5 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1241, 1245 (quoting 425 U.S. at 762). 
71. Friedman v. Rogers, 440.U.S. at 18 n.19. See Redish, The First Amendment in 1l1e 
MarkeljJlace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
429, 430 (1971). 
72. 436 U.S. at 459. In Bates, the Court referred to the attorney's interest in advertising as 
"largely economic." 433 U.S. at 364. The Court may have been unwilling to deny completely 
the elements of individual expression in advertising by lawyers. But this personal interest 
would not extend to a large publicly held corporation. 
73. 440 U.S. at 8. . . 
74. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
75. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 763-65 (1976). 
76. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21, at 35-36: 
If independent first amendment significance did exist, it would also exist when the state 
has declared the underlying transaction unlawful. • . . That no such independent purpose 
in fact can be identified confirms the hypothesis that the significance of ordinary business 
advertising lies entirely in its relation to the contemplated economic transaction. 
77. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 763 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn. on Human Relations, 413 US. 376 
(1973). 
78. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
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like the interest in prescription drug services, may be "the alleviation 
of pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities."79 At the very least, it 
is an interest in "daily comfort."80 Daily comfort is not illegal, but 
under the Court's analysis it is not a fundamental right, either. The 
state may infringe upon it by comporting with the requirements of 
· due process and equal protection.81 Therefore, within those minimal 
constraints, New York could deny electrical services to consumers 
altogether.82 Since the individual's interest in electrical service is in-
adequate to outweigh a legitimate state interest in denying that ser-
vice, the individual's interest in information about electricity sales 
should not outweigh New York's substantial interest in preventing 
its advertisement. 
3. Society's Interest in the Free Flow of Information 
The most important interest served by utility advertising is a gen-
eral one: society's desire to maintain a free flow of commercial in-
formation. In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court suggested two 
ways in which society's interest in the free flow of commercial tdeas 
might exceed the sum of the interests of speakers and listeners. The 
first is economic: "So long as we preserve a predominantly free en-
terprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure 
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a 
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well inf ormed."83 The second is political: "[I]t is also 
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [the 
economic] system ought to be regulated or altered."84 
The free enterprise justification for a special societal interest in 
advertising, although plausible in Virginia Board of Pharmacy where 
the regulation was motivated by purposes other than the allocation 
of resources, seems irrelevant to the PSC ban. The PSC's goal is 
precisely to override the market's allocation of society's resources. 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy was not suggesting that the Constitution 
requires a legislature "to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its 
79. 425 U.S. at 764. 
80. [1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1241, 1245. 
81. See note 36 supra. 
82. This is admittedly a troubling proposition. The tension, however, lies not in the first 
amendment reasoning; rather it is embedded in the conclusion that there is no fundamental 
right to shelter. Is it more troubling that a state may deny someone information contained in 
an electricity advertisement than that a state may allow a public utility to discontinue all ser-
vice to an indigent family? 
Nonetheless, not even a fundamental right to shelter would outweigh the state's interest in 
conserving energy if that interest were found "compelling." See note 28 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
83. 425 U.S. at 765. 
84. 425 U.S. at 765. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21, at 18 n.58. 
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legislative decisions";B5 rather, it was noting the value of free com-
mercial speech where the Virginia legislature had not disclaimed the 
economic rationality of the invisible hand. New York, pursuant to 
its undisputed authority to regulate the market, has disclaimed the 
invisible hand. By banning promotional utility advertising, New 
York has decided that the unchecked operations of the market fail to 
allocate resources properly. Thus, the utilities' promotional adver-
tisements serve no public interest in resource allocation; the only ec-
onomic interests served by the advertisements are purely private. 
As for the political value of commercial information, the Court 
has never repeated its observation in Virginia .Board ef Pharmacy 
that commercial speech is "an instrument to enlighten public deci-
sionmaking in a democracy."B6 It is not clear that the Court contin-
ues to perceive the free fl.ow of commercial information as 
"indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [the 
economic] system ought to be regulated."B7 Later commercial 
speech cases have stressed the presence or absence of a substantial 
state interest in regulation, declining to comment on the value of 
commercial speech as a source of information for political deci-
sion. BB 
Moreover, the Court's 1978 decision in .Bellotti v. First National 
.Bank ef .Boston,B9 which expressly protected corporate political 
speech, may have eliminated any need to protect commercial adver-
tising as a source of politically valuable information. Any informa-
tion that would reach the electorate or political leaders through 
corporate political speech now receives first amendment protection. 
The political importance of commercial speech is not even arguably 
85. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
784 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting and arguing for the proposition opposite from that given 
in text). 
86. 425 U.S. at 765. 
87. 425 U.S. at 765. 
88. If the Court has abandoned the view that regulable commercial speech has value in the 
political process, then the value of commercial speech may be defined entirely in economic 
terms. As such, regulable commercial speech would be entitled only to fifth and fourteenth 
amendment protection. See note 36 supra. This may lead to a more workable standard than 
has emerged thus far. For example, the Court could rule that a prohibition of commercial 
advertising is valid if a legislature has identified the advertised activity as harmful; such a rule 
would at least assure an adequate end-means fit. 
89. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Court has indicated, however, that corporate political speech 
may be entitled to less protection than individual political expression. "(W]e need not survey 
the outer boundaries of the [First] Amendment's protection of corporate speech, or address the 
abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy 
under the First Amendment." 435 U.S. at 777. "The individual's interest in self-expression is 
a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed discus-
sion." 435 U.S. at 777 n.12. "Nor is there any occasion to consider in this case whether, under 
different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as 
applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations, 
unions, or like entities." 435 U.S. at 777-78 n.13. 
January 1980] Note - Commercial Speech 449 
significant for information that would reach the public in another, 
protected way. But direct corporate efforts to inform or persuade 
those who make regulatory decisions will almost always convey any 
information about "who is producing and selling what product, for 
what reason, and at what price"90 that would be conveyed through 
advertising. 
Admittedly, the PSC ban denies business the opportunity to 
profit from its communication. Perhaps this denial would reduce the 
utilities' incentive to communicate with the public, the legislature, 
and the Public Service Commission. Although the ban leaves the 
utilities free to advertise on an informational or institutional basis,91 
and the utilities have long used such advertising to influence regula-
tory decisions,92 the ban may keep some iota of information from 
reaching the public forum. The question is whether that possibility 
outweighs the state's interest in preventing the waste of scarce energy 
resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The New York ban on promotional advertising by electric utili-
ties reasonably promotes the state's legitimate and substantial inter-
est in energy conservation. Under the Supreme Court's commercial 
speech balancing test, that interest should be weighed against the in-
terests in electric utility promotional advertising. The interests po-
tentially advanced by the advertising are slight compared to the 
state's interest. The advertiser's interest in profit is purely economic, 
and the consumer's interest in advertising is Iio greater than his in-
terest in consuming electricity. Both, under the Supreme Court's 
reasoning, may be subordinated to reasonable state regulation in the 
public interest. Society has an interest in the proper allocation of 
resources through informed market decisions, but the state can allo-
cate resources directly if it chooses, rather than relying on the market 
process. Society also has an interest in the free flow of information 
relevant to regulating electric utilities, but such information may be 
communicated by informational, institutional, or political advenis-
ing. Because the utilities are motivated to influence regulatory deci-
sions through such advertising, the elimination of promotional 
advertising is unlikely to keep useful information from the polity. 
90. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
765 (1976). 
91. See Statement, supra note 3, at 8-R. 
92. To the extent that this type of advertising reduces the utility consumer's hostility, it 
may be a good investment for the utility since it may reduce the flow of consumer com-
plaints to the regulatory commission. In addition, the corporate itp.age advertising may 
have a direct impact on the regulatory commission and may tend to shift the balance of 
power between utility and customer with respect to the regulatory commission's outlook. 
Wilder, Public Utility Advertising: Some Observations, 49 LAND EcoN. 458, 459 (1973). 
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New York has not found it necessary or desirable to limit sales of 
electricity directly, but the state has a strong interest in discouraging 
its use. The ban is founded not on paternalism that distrusts the 
individual's ability to perceive his own best interest, but rather on 
legitimate state power that limits individual activity in the interests 
of society as a whole. There is, therefore, insufficient reason to de-
prive the state of its authority to conserve energy by banning adver-
tising. 
